In 2025, 232 of the 255 applications concerning Belgium dealt with by the European Court were declared inadmissible or struck out. Strasbourg is not a continuation of the Belgian proceedings: exhaustion, the time limit and the framing of the complaint decide whether the merits are ever examined.
The statistics should give every Belgian human-rights practitioner pause.
In 2025, the European Court of Human Rights dealt with 255 applications concerning Belgium. 232 were declared inadmissible or struck out. Only 23 applications were decided by judgment, in eight judgments.
In 2024, the difference was even more striking: 595 applications were dealt with, while 582 were declared inadmissible or struck out. Only 13 were decided by judgment, in four judgments.
These figures do not mean that every application that failed should have succeeded. Cases may be struck out for different reasons, including friendly settlements, and many applications will genuinely not satisfy the requirements of the Convention.
But the figures raise a more important question:
How many potentially arguable human-rights cases never reach an examination of the merits because the transition from Belgian litigation to Strasbourg was approached in the wrong way?
That question matters.
Because Strasbourg litigation has a different logic.
A lawyer can conduct an excellent case before a Belgian criminal court, a court of appeal, the Council of State, the Constitutional Court or the Court of Cassation and still face an entirely different exercise when the case moves to Strasbourg.
The European Court of Human Rights is not another appellate court.
It does not simply ask whether the Belgian judge was wrong.
It asks whether Belgium complied with the European Convention on Human Rights.
That requires a different way of analysing the file, selecting the complaints and presenting the case.
The strongest argument before a Belgian court is not necessarily the strongest argument before Strasbourg.
A procedural irregularity under Belgian law does not automatically amount to a violation of Article 6. A severe measure does not automatically violate Article 3 or Article 8. A confiscation measure does not automatically violate Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
The case must be reconstructed through the autonomous concepts, tests and case-law of the Convention.
That is a specialised exercise.
The danger is that mistakes at this stage can be irreversible.
A potentially serious Convention complaint may never be examined because the relevant domestic remedy was not exhausted.
Or because the Convention issue was never sufficiently raised before the Belgian courts.
Or because counsel waited for a national procedure which, for the particular Convention complaint, was not an effective remedy — while the Strasbourg time limit was already running.
Or because an application essentially asks the European Court to reconsider facts and domestic law as a fourth-instance court.
Or because the application does not satisfy the Court's strict procedural requirements.
These are not secondary technicalities.
They determine whether the Court will ever examine the alleged human-rights violation.
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires the exhaustion of domestic remedies. In the Court's case-law, this means remedies that are available and effective.
But exhaustion cannot simply be reduced to reaching the highest possible Belgian court.
A remedy must be effective for the particular Convention complaint.
Belgium itself provides examples of how important this distinction is.
In Missaoui and Akhandaf v. Belgium (dec.), no. 54795/21, 3 September 2024, the applicants did not lodge an appeal on points of law after receiving a negative opinion from a lawyer at the Court of Cassation. Strasbourg considered that, in the particular circumstances — the Court of Cassation had never ruled on the question and the case-law of the lower courts appeared to diverge — this did not exempt them from pursuing cassation, and it declared the application inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
Yet the opposite problem can also arise.
A lawyer may continue pursuing a remedy which Strasbourg does not regard as necessary for the Convention complaint and incorrectly assume that the Strasbourg time limit has therefore not started.
The real question is:
Which domestic remedy had to be exhausted for this specific Convention complaint, and when was that process complete?
That is a Strasbourg question.
Where the final domestic decision was taken on or after 1 February 2022, an applicant normally has four months from that decision to bring a case before the European Court.
But identifying that decision can itself require Convention analysis.
The chronologically last judgment in a national file is not necessarily the judgment from which the four-month period runs.
A later procedure which cannot provide effective redress for the particular Convention complaint does not necessarily postpone the Strasbourg time limit.
The Belgian case of Chaaban and Others v. Belgium (dec.), no. 57273/16, 12 February 2019, decided under the former six-month rule, provides a striking illustration of that problem. Without an appeal by the public prosecutor, the civil parties' own appeal on points of law could lead only to damages; the Court held that it did not postpone the time limit, which ran from 15 March 2016, and declared the application lodged on 23 September 2016 out of time.
Another misconception is that once domestic proceedings have ended, preparing the Strasbourg application is essentially an administrative exercise.
It is not.
The lawyer must identify the Convention complaint, establish exhaustion, verify that the complaint was properly preserved domestically, calculate the correct time limit, select the decisive facts and supporting documents and structure the case within the Court's procedural framework.
More arguments do not necessarily produce a stronger application.
More pages do not necessarily produce a stronger application.
A Strasbourg case requires selection, structure and strategy.
Before a domestic court, the principal question may have been:
Was the judgment legally wrong?
In Strasbourg, the question becomes:
What precisely did the State do or fail to do, which Convention right was engaged, what test does the European Court apply, and why did the national response fail that test?
That change of perspective is fundamental.
Strasbourg litigation is a separate procedural discipline.
The high number of Belgian applications that do not reach judgment does not establish that Belgium lacks serious human-rights cases.
Belgium has repeatedly been found to have violated Convention rights, and Convention provisions are regularly invoked before Belgian courts.
The concern is different.
A potentially arguable Convention case should not disappear before the merits because Strasbourg procedure was treated as an ordinary continuation of domestic litigation.
Once the relevant domestic proceedings have ended, there may be very little room to correct a mistake.
A missed time limit cannot simply be repaired.
A Convention complaint that was never properly preserved may no longer be recoverable afterwards.
For counsel, the decision whether — and how — to proceed to Strasbourg therefore carries considerable responsibility.
This is why the transition from the final domestic proceedings to Strasbourg deserves a separate and specialised Convention analysis.
Just Rights Europe focuses on that transition: identifying cases with genuine Convention potential after the highest domestic proceedings and structuring them for litigation before the European Court of Human Rights.
A strong domestic case is not automatically an admissible Strasbourg case.
Strasbourg has its own logic. And that logic must be understood before the application is filed.
These notes are general information on Convention law; they do not constitute legal advice and do not create a lawyer-client relationship.
After the final decision of the highest national court, a case may be submitted to us directly, by the client or by national counsel.